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Abstract
In this paper, I tie four concepts together to form a defense both of videogames as art, and of
rhetoric as a value-neutral tool of expression, that can be both positive and useful for society.
(1) In the first chapter, I explain the Platonic view of rhetoric as an “empty knack” and how it
differs from other accounts of rhetoric, ancient and modern. (2) In the second chapter I present
a nuanced understanding of the role emotion plays in practical moral reasoning under a
computational model of the mind, as described by Antonio Damasio’s neurological somatic
marker theory in Descartes’ Error. (3) I will argue in the third chapter that the strong
relationship between rhetoric, emotion and reasoning explains rhetoric’s success in human
societies throughout history, and allows modern artists to express ideas in powerful new ways.
(4) In the fourth chapter I give an account of rhetoric in videogames and how narrative, visual,
and procedural rhetoric are all used in videogame design. (5) Finally, in the fifth chapter I use
the concepts established in the previous chapters to defend the value of the expressive power
of rhetoric through a thorough analysis of the various kinds of rhetoric used in Bioshock to
explore these very issues in a philosophically significant way, and what we can learn from it.
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Chapter One – A Brief Genealogy of Rhetoric
Historically, rhetoric has a bad rap. Throughout Europe’s history, rhetoric usually
referred to the art of persuasion specifically used in political settings like public assemblies and
courtroom trials. Rhetoric has long been used in the context of public speech and “especially
legal and civic speech… Spoken words attempt to convert listeners to a particular opinion,
usually one that will influence direct and immediate action…” (Bogost, 15).1 Indeed, the earliest
use of rhetoric appears in Plato’s Dialogues circa 400 BC, referring to the Sophist “art of
persuasion” and, in The Republic, to the power drama and the arts have over the emotional
states of the spectators in the audience. Many contemporary philosophers of art hold this view
of “mass art,” as it is now called, as being base, crude, and unsophisticated. I follow Noel
Carroll’s defense of mass art against Platonic attacks, as he argues in A Philosophy of Mass Art.
Plato thought that emotions like fear and pity were maladaptive – such emotions inhibit
the soldiers’ ability to fight the enemy in battle, for example. They cloud an individual’s ability
to reason by inflaming his or her emotions, subverting Plato’s ideal picture of human as a
“rational animal” and the good city as a “rational state.” The prevailing theory behind ancient
oral rhetoric was to subvert the reason of the one to be persuaded by appealing to an
emotional response – a powerful move when a citizen has to defend himself in court, for
example. Indeed, Plato’s central argument against art and rhetoric “hinged on his conviction
that the emotions are irrational in the sense that they undermine the rule of reason, both in the
individual and, in consequence, in society…” (Carroll, 250). In Plato’s view, the emotions oppose
reason, and any threat to reason constitutes a threat to both the individual and the community
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at large. Even worse, Plato felt that artists must inevitably pander to the emotions of the
audience, even if they wanted to produce “good” art. “That is, Plato argued, the general
audience, knowing little, would have to be addressed in terms of their emotions rather than
their understanding” (Carroll, 251). This is a flaw inherent to drama and poetry – Plato doesn’t
think artists can really escape it, if they want their art to be popular.
Ever since Plato formulated his argument against drama and the arts in The Republic,
rhetoric has been scrutinized as an empty “knack,” a way for the sly to sway opinions in their
favor. Some philosophers still hold to the Platonic (or Neo-Platonic) view of emotion in art.
In his Republic, Plato developed a battery of arguments against drama
and painting. Many of the arguments that one finds against mass art in
the twentieth century are merely transparent adaptations of Plato’s
arguments… Plato’s arguments were introduced in order to state the case
for banishing the arts from the good city. Likewise, many latter-day
Platonists are in favour of censoring mass art. (Carroll, 250)
Even today, contemporary philosophers will reduce rhetoric to “mere persuasion.”
Distinguished French philosopher Paul Ricœur sums up this view elegantly in his essays on
Aristotle’s rhetoric, as “an ironic tale of diminishing returns… in reducing itself thus to one of its
parts, rhetoric simultaneously lost the nexus that bound it through dialectic to philosophy; and
once this link was lost, rhetoric became an erratic and futile discipline” (Averill, 13).2
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Plato argued that civic rhetoric and public artworks make manipulating others far too
easy, throwing the good city into disorderly chaos, run by the desires of those who could spin
the best speech. The masses are completely unable to make decisions on their own because
they could be swayed by the most persuasive speeches. In short, Plato’s primary worry was that
civic life could be controlled by the man or group of men who could deliver the best speech, not
necessarily a capable leader with the city’s good in mind. This is due, in part, because the art in
ancient Greece was nearly all representational – that is, artistic performance was aimed at
reproducing the appearance of something from real life. Ancient Greeks read poetry and drama
aloud and by identifying with the characters who vented these emotions, the audience
members would adopt the characters’ untoward emotional dispositions, which inhibits their
reason. It is understandable, then, that Plato could not have foreseen the radically different
ways contemporary artists have learned to communicate to an audience. He certainly would
not have considered the multi-billion dollar entertainment industries that shape so much of our
lives today.
Despite the wide propagation of Plato’s view of art in The Republic, there were those in
Ancient Greece who would classify rhetoric as a civic art, believing that the power of rhetoric
could be harnessed by artists to help direct and shape a community, to help constitute the
character of its citizens, and to otherwise improve life. Isocrates lived and wrote in the same
time and culture as Plato; like Plato, Isocrates studied under Socrates, but he also studied with
a variety of Sophists – the group of orators who bore the brunt of Plato’s attack on rhetoric.
Isocrates had neither the voice nor the charisma to earn his living as an orator, so he taught
rhetoric instead. He excelled at teaching, and students came from all over the Mediterranean to
3

learn from him. He was, by all accounts, a very practical and down-to-earth man, and thought
Plato’s brand of metaphysics was a waste of time and energy when there were real, earthly
problems to deal with first, namely, attending to the civic and political affairs of running the
city. Isocrates placed a strong emphasis on an education system that included art and rhetoric,
and the civic benefits that come along with a citizenship educated in this manner. In Against the
Sophists, Isocrates seeks to distinguish himself from the other sophists by arguing for rhetoric
as a useful tool – one that allows citizens to positively influence the society in which they live.
Even good leaders, competent and honest, need a way to communicate with the people they
lead. Sure, bad people can use rhetoric to manipulate others for personal gain, but that only
says something about the badness of those people. After all, useful things don’t stop being
useful just because a bad person can direct it towards his purpose. Without rhetoric, Isocrates
thinks even good leaders would be rendered ineffectual.
…those who desire to follow the true precepts of discipline may, if they
will, be helped more speedily towards honesty of character than towards
facility in oratory. And let no one suppose that I claim that just living can
be taught; for, in a word, I hold that there does not exist an art of the
kind which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures.
Nevertheless, I do think that the study of political discourse can help
more than any other thing to stimulate and form such qualities of
character.3
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In his Antidosis, Isocrates argues for the power of communication to shape the character of a
man (and thus, a city) for better or for ill. Cultivating one’s emotions, he thought, is a
fundamental part of what elevates human beings above the other animals, who lack language.
[Men] have come together and founded cities and made laws and
invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by
man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish.4
Isocrates influenced Cicero, who believed that if the tools of rhetoric were simply put into the
hands of the right people, the civic rhetoric of public art of could be used to actually save the
Republic. Aristotle, too, thought rhetoric was a civic art with great potential to do good. These
thinkers are very much the source of our systems of education today.
Over time, ‘rhetoric’ has come to mean more than what Plato and Isocrates understood
as rhetoric. James Averill, a professor of psychology at the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst, argues that looking at a history of rhetoric shows a recent proliferation of types of
rhetoric,
Rhetoric has expanded as well as contracted; it is no longer limited to the
study of oral presentations, but includes literature and art. Theories of…
rhetoric are not only flourishing, they are multiplying in bewildering
numbers, but under different rubrics: semiotics, structuralism,
hermeneutics, deconstruction, and dialogies, to name but a few.
(Averill, 13)

4
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Despite rhetoric’s largely negative connotations, today advertising forms the basis of entire
industries, stories told in books and television shows evoke emotional responses to keep us
engaged in the both the specific narrative and the culture at large, and thousands of opinions
are advocated every day on the innumerable blogs on the Internet. In the courtroom and on
the news, politicians and lawyers still spout well-crafted pleas for support in a fashion very
reminiscent of the sort with which Plato was familiar. The new forms of rhetoric that
developed in the wake of technological and social changes are not merely reiterations of the
old, oratory rhetoric with which Plato was familiar. Rather, they are new forms of persuasive
communication, each with their own rules and good-making properties, allowing us to express
ideas to each other in significantly new ways. Over time, rhetoric has come to mean more than
“persuasive speech,” and computer games like Bioshock, the focus of my analysis in Chapter
Five, present a fine example of what I’m talking about here – the way a videogame expresses
ideas can be radically different from the way a novel or film expresses ideas. At a fundamental
level, a book is read, a film is viewed, and a game is played. The various media differ greatly in
preparation, presentation, and reception, and this variety of expression allows for an incredible
space of communicative possibility. In the famous words of Marshal McLuhan, “the medium is
the message;” put a bit less strongly, the medium in which one expresses an idea, narrative, or
aesthetic is often a large part of the experience of the recipient, as the way an idea is
communicated can dramatically influence the impact of the communication.
Though the Platonic view of rhetoric has remained popular in philosophy, the influence
of Isocrates and Aristotle can also be seen in modern thinkers. For example, James Boyd White,
an American literary critic and philosopher of law, argues that community and civic life are
6

defined by the words of persuasion and identification that persist throughout a society – a
subset of contemporary rhetoric called constitutive rhetoric. By analyzing the constitutive
rhetoric found in legal texts, White hopes to shed more light on the interdisciplinary exchange
between law and literature. Along these lines, White maintains that well-crafted artistic
rhetoric can address social or political issues in unique ways and, in doing so, subtlety but
substantially influencing the Zeitgeist of the entire culture. Culture itself, he claims, “is
maintained, criticized, and transformed” by the power of rhetoric.5
Rhetoric as a craft has flourished in the globalized economy precisely because it does
work, consistently enough for corporations and syndicates to invest billions of dollars into it
every year. Indeed, rhetoric tends to thrive in democratic societies where the individual’s rights
to free speech and free assembly create a cultural need for both artistic expression and clear
and effective persuasion. If rhetoric were, as Plato suggests, merely a knack for deception and
misdirection, how could we explain its pervasiveness and consistent success as a tool of
expression? It is significant to note here that Plato clearly knew that a skilled application of
rhetoric tends to succeed in its persuasive task – that was why rhetoric worried him so much,
and why it represented a very real threat to his imagined Republic. Indeed, it is true that today
the best advertisements (the majority of today’s rhetoric) works even when directed towards
people who understand rhetoric and have been trained to recognize it. The best ads work their
magic without the viewer even realizing its affect on him or her; the viewer may even believe
the reasoning to be his or her own, not one from an external source!

5
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[Some critics] contend that since some products are basically alike, all too often
advertisers appeal to people's baser instincts and emotions to sell their products.
To stimulate the demand for a product, they attach psychological values such as
acquisitiveness, power, sexual pleasure, attractiveness, social approval, and
competitive success, none of which are in the product. To attain these values, all
the consumer needs to do is to buy the appropriate product. In brief, advertising
is an exercise in a special kind of persuasion. As if these criticisms were not
enough, advertisers have been accused of manipulating people without their
consent at some deeper level of consciousness, of “selling to the id,” as one critic
put it. (D’Angelo, 1986)
This picture certainly seems to be what Plato was worried about in his attack on the arts in The
Republic – the rationality of the audience seems to be weakened by the emotionally stirring
content of the rhetorical artifact. But could there be more going on here than the
straightforward Platonic story? After all, Plato’s position on rhetoric presupposes that
dispassionate, distanced reason is a viable alternative to allowing oneself to be swayed by the
emotional appeals of rhetoric. It seems Plato’s civic concerns over the power of rampant
emotion were not unfounded, but could his solution to these problems be antiquated and
inadequate?

8

The Platonic tendency is to think that the emotions are irrational or
opposed to reason, Thus if art – drama or mass art – addresses the
emotions, it will address the irrational in us and, in consequence,
undermine reason’s control. But the obvious question to ask about this
argument is whether in fact the distinction between reason and the
emotions is as sharp and antagonistic as the Platonist maintains…
(Carroll, 252)
This is precisely what I address in the next chapter by looking at Antonio Damasio’s neurological
approach to emotions in Descartes’ Error. Attempting to understand the interplay between
emotion and reason in the brain offers more insight on how rhetoric utilizes emotion to
influence an agent’s practical reasoning. We can then better assess Plato’s concern that
rhetoric threatens rational autonomy, as he maintains in his critique of the emotive element of
the arts.

9

Chapter Two – The Foundation of Emotions in Practical Reasoning
Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being
has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that
is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for
the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than
practical reason. –– Immanuel Kant (Groundwork, 4:412) (emphasis is
mine)
Traditional accounts of the machinery of the human brain have the “older” brain core
handling the most basic biological functions at the bottom of the brain, while the neocortex at
the top calculates with calm, subtle wisdom. “Upstairs in the cortex there is reason and
willpower, while downstairs in the subcortex there is emotion and all that weak fleshy stuff.” In
Descartes’ Error, Damasio rejects this traditional view, insofar as it distinguishes between
higher and lower thought processes. “Nature,” he writes, “appears to have built the apparatus
of rationality not just on top of the apparatus of biological regulation, but also from it and with
it… the neocortex becomes engaged along with the older brain core, and rationality results
from their concerted activity” (Damasio, 128).6 David Hume offers a more philosophical version
of the traditional view of the play between reason and passion:
Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to
talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to
reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform
6
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themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, ‘tis said, is oblig’d to
regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle
challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, ‘till it be
entirely subdu’d, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior
principle… The eternity, invariableness, and divine origin of [reason] have
been display’d to the best advantage: the blindness, unconstancy, and
deceitfulness of [passion] have been strongly insisted on. (T 2.3.3, 413)7
Damasio argues from neurological empirical evidence that emotion actually plays a crucial role
in our reasoning. Based on Damasio’s neurological understanding of emotion and reasoning, I
hope to defend Averill’s and Carroll’s view of rhetoric as an emotive tool of communication,
against the misguided Platonic view of rhetoric as a vapid excitation of emotion.
According to his somatic marker theory, there is a close bond between “a collection of
brain regions and the processes of reasoning and decision making” (Damasio, 78). The
neurological systems that are involved in plan-making and response-deciding are also tied to
the seat of emotion in the brain. Damasio’s theory is based on his studies on biologicallyregulated response selections. In short, a somatic marker is “a neurophysiological response
that, through learning, comes to be associated with a given mental representation...” Such
responses lead to “the visceral experience of an emotion, an emotional quale. These visceral
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responses help ‘edit’ the vast list of possible [choices]” (Megill, and Cogburn, 309).8 These
processes are continuous and are made without the organism ever being conscious of them.
The role emotion plays in reasoning is counter-intuitive. In “Easy’s Gettin’ Harder All the
Time,” Jason Megill and Jon Cogburn compare Damasio’s theory with Daniel Dennett’s work in
the philosophy of cognition and how it relates to developments in the field of artificial
intelligence... or, the lack of developments, as the case may be. In Dennett’s hypothetical
example, a series of robots are programmed to retrieve a battery from a room where a “bomb”
is ready to detonate. Time and time again, the robots fail to carry their programming out –
either they freeze up when faced with unexpected conditions and contradictory coding, or they
bring the bomb out with the battery. The problem Dennett is illustrating seems simple – the
robots’ possible courses of action had too many implications for the computer to sort through
effectively, leading to seemingly erratic behavior. These examples exhibit what has become
known in the artificial intelligence community as the frame problem.
In short, the frame problem can be seen as a cluster of questions, all of
which revolve around the question of how an agent determines
relevance: (1) how does an agent determine what the relevant objects in
its environment are, (2) how does an agent recognize what the relevant
implications of any given action are, (3) how does an agent efficiently
access what specific pieces of knowledge in a vast knowledge-base are

8
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relevant to a given situation? In short, how does an agent determine
relevance? (Megill, and Cogburn, 308)
The frame problem, as Dennett’s imaginary robots show, concerns how machine intelligences
can be taught to determine the relevant consequences of a set of given actions in a dynamic,
adaptive way.
Comparisons have been drawn between the human mind and “thinking machines” ever
since the first computers were dreamed up. A problem common to a computational theory of
the mind has been the presence of emotion and instinctual desires in humans and other
animals, which computers obviously seem to lack. Human reasoning, then, appeared to be
ineffectual compared to our digital counterparts, which plugged away at problems
systematically until a conclusion could be calculated.
Megill and Cogburn suggest that Damasio’s somatic marker theory presents an
explanation for how human beings avoid the frame problem. A somatic marker is a
neurophysiological reaction in an individual, a visceral experience that is triggered by certain
stimuli. This response becomes associated with a specific mental representation. These learned
responses make people develop personal feelings about certain things, which help them filter
through the staggering list of possible choices at any given moment.
When a human is faced with a rather large and unmanageable list, the
emotions play a central role in making the list smaller and more
manageable. Negative emotional qualia may eliminate some options
from the list, for example, while positive emotional qualia may bookmark
other options as desirable…” (Megill, and Cogburn 312).
13

After emotions have filtered out extraneous inferences and brought in especially relevant
inferences, the agent is able to exercise rational deliberation. When the emotional equipment
in one’s brain is damaged, he or she will likely suffer from the frame problem – they simply
won’t know where to start as they are overwhelmed with choices with no way of filtering out
the most relevant inferences.
In fact, this is precisely what Damasio discovered in his neurological work with people
who suffered tissue damage in the emotional areas of the brain. Elliot, one of Damasio’s
patients described in his book, was a successful, functioning person until a brain tumor in his
frontal lobe damaged the brain tissue and had to be removed. The consequences of his
operation seemed innocuous at first - Elliot’s memories and knowledge-base were intact. In
time, however, it became clear that his brain damage completely undermined his decisionmaking ability. In a psychological test, they showed Elliot and others a set of images depicting
horrible disasters,
…buildings collapsing in earthquakes, houses burning, people injured in
gory accidents or about to drown in floods. As we debriefed Elliot from
one of many sessions of viewing these images, he told me without
equivocation that his own feelings has changed from before his illness.
He could sense how topics that once had evoked a strong emotion no
longer caused any reaction, positive or negative. (Damasio, 45)
Elliot was fired again and again from jobs he tried to hold. He divorced and remarried several
times after his illness, and his altered behavior drove away friends and family. “Intriguingly,
Damasio was led to link Elliot’s inability to make decisions and effectively cope with his
14

environment with this loss of emotional qualia” (Megill, and Cogburn, 311). Without his
emotional faculties, his practical reasoning had no emotional filter. His brain was no longer able
to connect somatic markers to case-by-case decision-making. After his emotions were “shut
off,” Elliot manifested the same irrationality Dennett’s robots displayed when suffering from
the frame problem.
Armed with Damasio’s discoveries, we can begin to make sense of the role emotions
play in practical reasoning. Emotions are a necessary neurological component of our practical
reasoning, as opposed to formal or theoretical reason. In practical reasoning, an agent
deliberates about what to do by considering itself and its situation. Theoretical reasoning, on
the other hand, is concerned with finding explanations for events that have already taken place
or making predictions about events that could happen in the future. Perhaps most importantly,
theoretical reasoning usually considers matters of impersonal fact. Both the natural sciences
and the social sciences are based almost entirely on this kind of impersonal theoretical
reasoning. In the same way, finding personal answers to normative questions involves practical
reasoning – “what should I do?” is the paradigmatic question of practical reasoning. It makes
sense, then, that emotions inform matters of practical reason far more than they influence
theoretical reasoning. Somatic markers come into play when a complicated decision needs to
be addressed quickly. With facts to check and systematic procedures to follow, matters of
theoretical reasoning like science are rarely require split-second assessments. When deciding
whether that shadow on the ground is a stick or a snake, a few seconds of thoughtful
consideration can be deadly. Practical moral reasoning needs emotional triggers which are
sometimes absent or overlooked in dry, theoretical moral codifications. These triggers are
15

usually learned by living in the world, but didactic art like Bioshock can help audiences better
understand the complexities of this element of human nature by presenting an experience
designed to evoke and explore these concepts. The game’s ‘first-personal’ rhetoric, i.e. the
gaming experience, allows players to better understand how emotional reasoning allows for
good moral practical reasoning.

16

Chapter Three – Persuasion through Poetry
In “The Rhetoric of Emotion, with a Note on What Makes Great Literature Great,” Averill
argues that art and literature (and other rhetoric) appeal to the emotions and the intellect
simultaneously, evoking both the intellectual creativity and emotional creativity.
The phrase “emotional creativity” might seem like an oxymoron.
Consider the following two propositions, both of which are commonly
held. First, creativity is a predominantly human (late evolutionary)
development, among the highest of the “higher” thought processes.
Second, emotions are biologically primitive responses, remnants of our
biological past. If these two propositions were correct, emotions and
creativity would be distinct – even incompatible – phenomena… Actually,
a good deal of evidence suggests that emotional creativity is not only
possible, but ubiquitous… (Averill, 8)
Failure to recognize the creative aspects of emotional experience stems from deeply held
cultural norms, dating back to that prejudice in ancient Greece which contrasts emotions
unflatteringly with reason, “the presumed hallmark of humankind” (Averill, 8). If we follow
Damasio, we find that intuitive emotive valuations provide a filter for possible solutions to
complex decisions. And, I will argue later, it is through those valuations that rhetoric can
subvert otherwise rational deliberations.
Rhetoric often aims to sway people through their feelings, but rhetoric and emotion
share several important features in common – “namely, both are persuasive acts and both are
occasioned by similar conditions.” Averill thinks emoting is a “persuasive act” because feeling
17

an emotion is meant to persuade the person experiencing the emotion. Averill notes that
rhetoric as a persuasive act is “a means of approaching truth in situations where certainty is not
possible, and yet where decision or action is called for” (Averill, 13). Rhetoric steps in when
logic and evidence are not conclusive by themselves. If there were no grounds for dispute (that
is, if some combination of logic and evidence were conclusive for such a situation) the cognitive
deliberation would be resolved immediately. Damasio’s patients with damaged brain tissue,
then, would not suffer from the frame problem as they do. Both rhetoric and emotions serve to
persuade the intellect towards one decision or another when reason alone does not suffice. In
addition, emotions are consulted when an agent is under certain conditions, the same
conditions which call for rhetorical persuasion, namely when knowledge is incomplete and
goals conflict
Averill posits a third similarity shared by both rhetoric and emotion – they both aim at
what is worth doing or preserving. They are “inextricably linked to values.” This is related to
Damasio’s somatic marker theory in that they both reject a strictly “hard-wired” view of
emotions. Instead, Averill’s understanding of emotions mirrors Damasio’s – emotions are
strong individualized states. Biology introduces fundamental emotional states through instinct;
consider, for example, a baby crying for food. However, personal experience shapes those basic
emotions into the diverse array of emotion-types we categorize generally and unspecifically.
“…emotions are not free to vary without constraint. The general form of our emotions is
contoured by biological predispositions (phylogenesis), fashioned by beliefs and values of
society (sociogenesis), and further molded by individual experiences (ontogenesis).” Averill sees
these contextual layers as “reinforcing one another, thus lending an emotional episode an
18

unambiguous meaning. However, when emotional responses are expressed out of context, they
are notoriously subject to misunderstanding” (Averill, 18-22). In part, it is these
misunderstandings that perpetuate the view of emotions as evolutionary baggage and rhetoric,
as Ricœur puts it, “an erratic and futile discipline.” It is true that rhetoric is usually of more
useful in practice than in forming theory. Averill notes that, while “theory deals with
abstractions, with universals… rhetoric, by contrast, focuses on concrete human actions within
particular contexts. In this respect, rhetoric has less in common with theory than with poetry”
(Averill, 18).
It is through poetry and the other arts that rhetoric enjoys its arguably greatest
successes. Faulkner, Twain, Virgil, Tolstoy, Dickens… when Avrill asks “What makes Great
Literature Great,” he is thinking of these masterful writers and their ilk, all of whom appeal to
the emotions of their readers through their narratives and the poetry of their words. As Averill
argues, emotions are not ‘hard-wired,’ but are pliable and can be shaped and reshaped through
the particular context of emotional occurrences and, of course, through persuasive rhetoric
that appeals to those emotions, as great works of literature do.
Literature – and I am counting rhetoric as a form of literature – can
simulate vicissitudes of an emotion on the human brain, much like a
computer program can simulate the course of an approaching storm on a
computer. To the extent that that is true, we have much to learn about
the emotions from a study of literature, including rhetoric. But the
reverse is also true, namely, our understanding of literature can profit
from the study of emotion. (Averill, 9)
19

It is worth noting that Averill here appeals to a computational picture of the human mind, just
as Damasio, Megill and Cogburn do. Indeed, the correlations between these various fields and
disciplines offer strong support for the idea that the human mind is (or is like) a powerful
computational system of concepts, memories, and inferences, selected for in nature to provide
the human animal with the highly-developed dynamic adaptive richness that distinguishes
humankind from the other members of the animal kingdom. Again, according to Averill,
Society provides us with a set of beliefs and rules that, together with
biological predispositions (‘our untamed animal heritage’), help
constitute the emotional syndromes recognized in ordinary language (e.
g., anger, fear, love, and grief). These syndromes are part of the culture
into which we are born. During socialization, an individual acquires
(initializes) the relevant beliefs and rules to form emotional schemascognitive structures that help shape the feelings and behavior of the
emoter, emotee, and any third-party witnesses to the emotion. (Averill,
23)
The picture Averill presents here is consistent with Damasio’s somatic marker theory, as well as
Megill and Cogburn’s article on Damasio’s book and the frame problem. When emotions strike,
they do not simply run through prebuilt procedures, hard-wired into our DNA. Rather, a good
deal of improvisation occurs. The goals of the emoter and emotee change from case to case,
and the context in which the interaction occurs informs the particulars of the emotional
sensation being triggered. However, “the results of such [emotional] improvisations may feed
back to alter the beliefs and rules that help constitute the emotional syndromes.” These
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changes accumulate slowly. They are diffused throughout a society; this is one of the ways that
emotions “undergo historical change and diverge across cultures” (Averill, 23). This feedback,
where the triggered emotional belief alters itself or other, related emotional beliefs, is where
rhetoric finds the proverbial chink in the armor.
If Damasio’s theory is correct, emotion plays a crucial role in practical reasoning by
filtering out an incredible number of thoughts and inferences, bringing the most relevant
options to the surface for our practical reasoning to focus on. If Megill and Cogburn are correct
those options, ranked in importance by somatic markers, help humans avoid the frame
problem that plagues the development of truly adaptive artificial intelligence. And, if Averill is
correct, emotion is not strictly hard-wired, but shaped by other emotional associations.
Whether it is oratory, visual, or narrative in nature, rhetoric often persuades successfully
because it affects reason indirectly, by appealing to the emotions that set the stage for rational
consideration. That is, successful rhetoric can alter a person’s emotional filter, upon which his
faculty of practical reasoning relies. This, I think, is how advertising works even on informed, adaware people – the television ad for McDonald’s influences viewers’ sensation of satisfying
hunger, so even when they dismiss the ad’s affect on their eating habits, their emotional filter
begins to associate McDonald’s hamburgers with the sensation of satisfying a hunger.
Understanding the relationships found in this triangle of influence that exists between human
emotion, reason, and rhetoric can help us better understand all three as aspects of valueforming rational deliberation. Averill is quite aware of the relation between storytelling,
rhetoric, and emotional brain states.
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Oatley suggests that literature – and I am counting rhetoric as a form of
literature – can simulate vicissitudes of an emotion on the human brain,
much like a computer program can simulate the course of an
approaching storm on a computer. To the extent that that is true, we
have much to learn about the emotions from a study of literature,
including rhetoric. But the reverse is also true, namely, our understanding
of literature can profit from the study of emotion. (Averill, 9)
Oatley, a professor emeritus of cognitive psychology at the University of Toronto, echoes
Damasio’s somatic marker theory, claiming that “emotions are occasioned by situations that
call for action when knowledge is incomplete or goals conflict” (Averill, 13). It is in this way that
the computational theory of the human mind, combined with Damasio’s somatic marker
theory, offers an explanation for rhetoric’s ubiquitous success in the information age and, in
part, what it is that makes great literature great.
This shows, I think, how rhetoric (of some kind) plays a critical role in even the most
serious artworks. Great works of music, film, literature – they are all designed to express, and
there are good-making techniques that facilitate successful communication to the audience.
Often, the rules of the rhetoric of different media overlap. For example, videogame makers
borrow liberally from the visual rhetoric of film by utilizing familiar shots and editing techniques
for in-game cinematics. Since all media is designed to express something to a human audience,
the good-making rules of expression for one medium will often overlap with the rules of others.
Not only that, but today’s artists and audiences are more sophisticated (in a technical sense),
having been immersed in various media from a young age. This means mass artworks today
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often combine the rhetoric of two or more media. Consider how modern filmmaking includes
the rhetoric of music in the form of the soundtrack, the rhetoric of theatre in the acting and
writing, and the rhetoric of advertising for the movie’s release, on top of the visual rhetoric of
directing and camerawork developed by earlier filmmakers specifically for the medium of film.
This is part of the reason it takes so much money and so many professionals to make a bigbudget film – there’s simply a great amount of rhetoric that must be made for a full-blown
Hollywood feature.
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Chapter Four – The Rhetoric of Advertising, Narrative, and Gameplay
Bioshock is particularly interesting because the developers utilized rhetoric of all kinds
to tell the game’s story which, ultimately, is about rhetoric, emotions, and freewill. The game
leverages everything from the rhetoric of film, the rhetoric of advertising, and the procedural
rhetoric of the systems and processes the game computes while the player interacts with the
digital environment. These rhetorical devices are used to communicate the game’s story and
themes, but they are also used to facilitate gameplay. For example, the neon advertisements
and posters not only convey narrative elements by passively showing the player what Rapture
was like before its devastating civil war, but they are also used to grab the player’s attention
and show him where to go. I address this feature in my analysis of the game proper, but here I
must describe how an artist or creative professional actually works with these different types of
rhetoric? More specifically, how does an artist make use of the features of a particular mode of
expression?
Carroll provides a great example of what we mean when we talk about the “rhetoric of
film,” as distinct from the rhetoric of music or the procedural rhetoric of computer programs.
Point-of-view editing is an extremely prevalent editing technique in television and movies to
communicate the emotional state of a character through the use of two types of shots – the
point/glace shot of the actress emoting while she looks at an object or character off-screen,
followed by a point/object shot of the object which brought on her emotional state. Sometimes
the object is actually present, and sometimes the character is merely remembering the object
in a brief, internal flashback.
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Through the point-of-view schema, the author can narrate by showing us
what a character is looking at and, thereby, indicate what is on her mind,
as well as conveying with some precision what the character feels about
whatever it is that she is seeing… the point/glace shot in the point-ofview figure is able to convey information to mass audiences about the
emotional states of characters. An obvious hypothesis here is that it is
likely that the point-of-view structure is able to do this by activating the
spectator’s innate capacities to recognize the gross category into which a
character’s facial expression falls. In short, the point/glance shot is a
device that is predicated upon engaging natural recognitional capacities
in such a way that mass audiences are able to identify the global
emotional state of the relevant character in the point/glance shot.
(Carroll, 284-285)
Point-of-view editing was developed for film, while that technology was still young and people
were beginning to experiment with the particulars of that new form of expression. Early
filmmakers had to discover what new things film could do that older forms of visual rhetoric
couldn’t do, or couldn’t do very well. It is interesting that point-of-view “editing” has been
adapted to graphic novels, where a panel depicts a point/glance “shot” and the next panel
contains the point/object “shot.” and many videogames use a similar technique to
communicate to the player his next goal or destination. A common staple in videogame design
involves pausing the action on-screen when the player enters a new area while the “camera”
flies through the level, pausing along the way in a series of point/object shots of the various
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elements the player will have to interact with in order to proceed: locked doors, hidden keys,
particularly difficult or interesting new types of enemies, et cetera.
What this shows, among other things, is that visual rhetoric had to be developed over
time by artists and authors. At no point was visual rhetoric “invented” so much as people
learned what methods of visual communication succeed and which do not. Indeed, the
experimenters were not so much breaking new ground as they were discovering what sorts of
pattern recognition capacities humans have. Carroll writes,
…the point-of-view structure functions because of the way in which the
point/glance shot engages our constitutional make-up in terms of
activating our cross-culturally endowed capacity to recognize at least
certain gross categories of emotions… the assimilation of the
point/object shot in mass artworks also depends on the audience’s
generic emotional capacities… the existence of nearly universal emotions
and of recognitional capacities that can track them makes point-of-view
editing… possible. (Carroll, 188)
This is why point-of-view editing works in videogames much the same way it works in television
and film – the human beings in the audience are constituted in a certain way such that point-ofview editing (correctly done) succeeds in tapping into our biological and psychological
emotional make-up. It “speaks” to the human creature at a very basic level (hence, the mass
appeal), and this is precisely what worried Plato about emotionally-charged art in the Republic.
In Damasio’s terms, instrumental reasoning is possible because Nature endowed us with our
emotional “filters” to circumvent the frame problem, allowing reason to step in and do its job
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even in the face of overwhelming options. It is this neurological component that visual
rhetorical techniques (like point-of-view editing) tap into.
The reason these communication techniques succeed regularly is that they speak to the
human creature at a very basic level (hence, the appeal of mass art), and this is precisely what
worried Plato about emotionally-charged art in the Republic.
…Plato and latter-day Platonists have tried to explain the function of the
emotions with respect to drama and mass art in terms of purely
economic necessity. The audience understands little, Plato and his
followers contend, so that the only way in which to engage it is through
the emotions, understood as irrational forces. I, of course, reject this
account in so far as I think the emotions are connected to cognition.
Indeed, addressing the emotions may in fact in some (even many) cases
provide an opportunity for understanding. Thus the elicitation of
emotional responses from audiences is not an alternative to cognition
and understanding. (Carroll, 269)
Damasio’s view of instrumental reasoning matches Carroll’s claim that emotions are connected
to cognition. Human reasoning is possible because Nature endowed us with our emotional
“filters” to circumvent the frame problem, allowing reason to step in and do its job even in the
face of overwhelming options. Our makeup is far from perfect – examples of excited emotions
leading to human error are everywhere – but that does not necessarily mean evoking emotions
is bad or inappropriate. It only means emotions are complicated – a common theme in art.
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The game also makes great use of the rhetoric of advertising, which is a contentious
topic even compared to other forms of rhetoric. Advertisements are some of the oldest forms
of rhetoric, and remain one of the most prevalent. Even before mass media, businesses relied
on advertisements to inform the public on what goods or services they offer, their prices, and
their means of distribution. Often, they would include bits of useful information alluding to why
buyers prefer (ought to prefer) one store over its competitors. Even early advertising rhetoric
used tried-and-true rhetorical strategies. “An ancient Egyptian version of poster advertising
made a religious appeal for ‘Ptolemy as the true Son of the Sun, the Father of the Moon, and
the Keeper of the Happiness of Men” (Bogost, 147). But today, there is such a heavy saturation
of advertisements, and the advertisements are so much more complex and sophisticated, that
society forms what Raymond Williams calls “an institutionalized system of commercial
information and persuasion.” Indeed, many people today would see the ancient Egyptian
advertisement and scoff at the blatant emotional appeal to cultural and religious identity.
Having lived in a world saturated by an enormous volume of advertising rhetoric, customers
today are much more savvy to simple rhetoric like the poster, or the objectivist propaganda
that decorates the walls of Ryan’s underwater city. Bogost writes,
There is barely a space in our culture not already carrying commercial
messages. Look anywhere; in schools there is Channel One; in movies
there is product placement; ads are in urinals, played on telephone hold,
in alphanumeric displays in taxis, sent unannounced to fax machines,
inside catalogs, on the video in front of the Stairmaster at the gym, on T-
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shirts, at the doctor’s office, on grocery carts, on parking meters, on tees
at golf holes, on inner-city basketball backboards, piped in along with
Muzak… ad nauseam (and yes, even on airline vomit bags). (Bogost, 147)
This media-saturated social environment has not only made consumers rhetoric-savvy, it has
also compelled advertisers to evolve in sophistication. James B. Twitchell has called this modern
practice “rent[ing] our concentration to other companies’ sponsors.” With mass media came
advertisements aimed at mass consumers. National print and radio, and especially television,
enabled advertisers to communicate to nearly every potential consumer all at once. As
marketing guru Seth Godin puts it, “Television was a miracle. It enabled companies with money
to effortlessly create more money.” These changes developed alongside the integration of the
social sciences, and advertising shifted from “a minimalist, rationalistic strategy to a
spectacular, emotional one” (Bogost, 149).
Advertisers have become so good at the rhetoric of their craft that even moralistic
responses to capitalism often talk of commercial consumption as if it were always a meaningful
cultural practice – consider the idea of voting with your dollar, taking personal pride in the
brands you buy, or becoming a ‘fan’ of a company on Facebook. “…advertising has become a
self-reflexive practice, with each consumer decision signifying another advertisement, not an
actual lifestyle, social, political, or personal choice. Baurillard calls this a simulation of
freedom.” Social historian Claude S. Fischer observes that “even Americans who critique
mainstream culture do so through their own consumption. Eating organic foods, wearing
handmade clothing, giving only wooden toys as gifts, and riding bicycles to work amounts to
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self-labeling.” Advertisers have come to rely on this mechanism of self-expression, even though
it is dubious to think of purchasing products as being automatically meaningful (Bogost, 148).
Rhetorical techniques work by tapping into the human neurological and emotional
makeup; Averill argues that great artists are the ones who take advantage of this immediate
emotional communication, not to merely get a rise out of the audience, which is both easy to
do and lacking in style. As Aristotle says, appropriate emotion is all about feeling the right
emotion at the right time and with the right intensity, and a skilled storyteller knows how to
leverage the desired emotional responses from the audience at the appropriate parts of the
tale, engaging them and lead them through the experience the artist has designed. It is at this
task that Bioshock succeeds so well.
Before detailing and analyzing the philosophically rich content in Bioshock, it will serve
at this point to address the elephant in the room – is it even worth our time to give a
videogame this kind of thorough, but charitable, academic analysis? In “Bioshock and the Art of
Rapture,” Grant Tavinor argues that “Bioshock is a videogame, and it is also clearly art; but it is
not as if the game is art despite its being a videogame, that the art is a mere gloss or veneer.”
Rather, Bioshock’s “nature as a game allows it to be art of a distinctive kind” (Tavinor, 92).
Indeed, Bioshock is of interest to us precisely because it takes advantage of its nature as a piece
of interactive fiction wherein the player-audience explores and interacts with a virtual world.
The game’s clever manipulation of narrative rhetoric, visual rhetoric (the banners and
propaganda lauding the objectivist virtues of the society that is now crumbling around the
player), and procedural rhetoric allows Bioshock to comment on the nature of social and
political persuasion, and the threat unethical use of these forces represents to autonomy.
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“These themes of freewill and morality take on an extraordinary richness,” writes Tavinor.
“Bioshock deliberately builds and reflects on its gaming nature to produce compelling and
original art” (Tavinor, 93). The development team at Irrational Games under Ken Levine that
designed, wrote, and programmed the videogame made excellent use of rhetoric of all types,
borrowing traditional techniques from film, literature, and oral rhetoric. This is significant
because Bioshock is ultimately about rhetoric, and the developers make clever use of
procedural rhetoric (i.e. the gameplay) to comment on the other, more traditional forms of
rhetoric found among the ruins of Rapture.
Propositionalists claim that artworks can be a source of information about the world,
either strongly as a source of knowledge or weakly a source of beliefs. In the analysis of an
artwork like Bioshock, there is a danger to engage in undue propositionalism – that is, we
should be careful not to project a bunch of themes and ideas that we think we see in the game,
but are really only projecting onto the artwork. It is said that art is a mirror in this way, because
it is often very easy for the audience to unwittingly project their own ideas and feelings onto
the artwork, mistakenly believing the artwork was inherently “about” those things. Again, these
issues recall Plato’s worries about art in the Republic. That being said, even Plato would agree
that it is wrong to dismiss all art commentary simply because there is a danger of
misinterpretation – he allowed the lute into the city, after all. In this analysis of Bioshock, I will
make every effort to back up my claims with evidence from interviews with lead designer Ken
Levine – Bioshock was his project from the very beginning – and from the game itself.
The propostionalist maintains that works like novels often implicitly suggest, imply, entail, or
presuppose interesting and informative generalizations and that as a result, they can be
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educative. Thus, artists can educate audiences in the same way natural scientists do – by
providing us with informative generalizations. (Carroll, 305)
The difference between a textbook and a novel is that, while the former educates
readers on the physical makeup of the world through objective description, the latter educates
readers on general human affairs though more emotional description. “Art,” Carroll argues,
“operates at the level of persons” and so the relevant generalizations presented in artworks are
often moral in nature, which scientific texts almost never are. Audiences derive non-trivial
moral information by picking up on the emotional cues the artist weaves into his creative
design and, when the artist is talented, those emotional punch-lines inform the audience how
to feel about the things they see, either about the general subject of the story or in the
particular context of the narrative they are following. Representations of human affairs are
often used as instruments of moral learning – think of Aesop’s fables or a powerful film like
Schindler’s List. They contain moral propositions which audiences acquire in the course of
consuming the artwork. Like scientific texts, they are “cogitatively valuable because of the
information they convey” (Carroll, 306).
There is not much of a fiction at all to chess, because stripping away its
apparent fictional content — that the game involves queens, kings, and
pawns—would leave intact a formal system apt to encode a game of
chess. But in Bioshock, and other recent videogames of a fictively rich
kind, the game is represented in terms of a fictional world. The play areas
in Bioshock are the corridors and hallways of Rapture. The moves that the
player makes involve battling genetically spliced mutants with a wrench,
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shotgun and other weapons. The objective is to defeat Andrew Ryan and
escape Rapture. The gameplay involves competition against a number of
computer controlled opponents. If these fictive elements were stripped
away from Bioshock, there simply would not be a game. (Tavinor, 93)
Bioshock is both a thought-provoking story about the human desire for control, and a game of
ethically-charged situations designed to evoke emotional responses in its players. But Bioshock
is worth our time because of the way it blends narrative rhetoric and techniques borrowed
from film with procedural rhetoric – using the game mechanics as another form of creative
expression. Thus, videogames like Bioshock can be more than entertainment – like great works
of literature and film, they can teach us important truths through fiction.
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Chapter Five – A Propositional Analysis of Bioshock
Bioshock opens with simple white letters on a black screen, giving us the setting – “1960
Mid-Atlantic.” Though this is a cutscene, and the player has no ability to input commands or
otherwise interrupt the scene, we are already seeing through the eyes of our in-game character
– the back of a seat on an airplane fills our view. In our hand is a lit cigarette, reaffirming the
setting. Our character speaks in voice over, another rhetorical technique borrowed from film.
“They told me… ‘Son, you’re special.’” Our character produces an old black-and-white photo of
him with his arms around an older couple that are presumably his parents. “You were born to
do great things.” Now our character produces a present, still bound in wrapping paper. The tag
reads “To Jack – with love, Mom and Dad.” Especially perceptive players may notice that the
writing on the tag continues, “Would you kindly…” but the rest of the message is cut off in the
frame. Our character, Jack, concludes his voice over, “They were right.” The plane suddenly
buckles. The scene fades to black but the sound continues; we hear the panicked cries of the
passengers and the plane crashing into the ocean. The Bioshock logo fades into view, water
running off of it as though it had been submerged and had just been pulled out of the water.
At this point, the player gains control of Jack, swimming in the waters near the downed
plane. We direct him towards a nearby lighthouse – the only thing in sight besides the tail of
the sinking plane. This builds up a great deal of dramatic tension, as a lighthouse in the middle
of the Atlantic is mysterious, to say the least. We soon discover that Jack has found a secret
entrance to an underwater city – Rapture. With nowhere else to go, the player rides a
bathysphere down to the art deco metropolis. The bathysphere projects a black and white film
on the wall as we sink deeper and deeper. This orientation film was clearly designed as a
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welcome to new denizens of Rapture. The city’s creator, a successful business magnate named
Andrew Ryan, explains how Rapture came to be.
I am Andrew Ryan, and I am here to ask you a question. “Is a man not
entitled to the sweat of his brow?”
“No,” says the man in Washington, “it belongs to the poor.”
“No,” says the man in the Vatican, “it belongs to God.”
“No,” says the man in Moscow, “it belongs to everyone.”
I rejected those answers. Instead, I chose something different. I chose the
impossible. I chose... Rapture. A city where the artist would not fear the
censor, where the scientist would not be bound by petty morality, where
the great would not be constrained by the small. And with the sweat of
your brow, Rapture can become your city, as well. (Bioshock, 2007)
When the bathysphere opens, Jack finds Rapture a decaying dystopia filled with Splicers – the
murderous former citizens of the city who now attack on sight, having been driven mad by the
plasmid products that meddle with consumers’ DNA, allowing them to control fire or move
distant objects with telekinesis. The advertisements for these plasmids still cover the walls of
Rapture. They are drawn with a retro, 1950s-style – though the products they advertise are
nothing less than commercially available superpowers, they bear straightforward slogans
(“Evolution in a Bottle! By Ryan Industries”) and perfectly match the art deco architecture of
the city. An ad for a teleportation plasmid reads “Get there in a hurry!” with a businessman
teleporting to work, briefcase in hand. Various ads for the Incinerate plasmid read, “Fire at your
Fingertips! Light up foes to a thousand degrees! Warning, fire spreads – By Ryan Industries” and
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“Incineration! When it absolutely positively has to erupt in flames, don't wait – Incinerate! – By
Ryan Industries.” It is significant to note here how the game uses the rhetoric of advertising to
show the player where to get supplies. There are vending machines with silly names like “The
Circus of Values” and even “Ammo Bandito” vending machines that sell various types of
ammunition.
These vending machines and advertisements serve two rhetorical purposes. Firstly,
there is a certain irony in that fact that, even with Rapture in anarchy, crumbling and flooding,
the advertisements are still successful! The player learns quickly to seek out the tale-tell lights
and musical jingles that reveal the location of a nearby vending machine or, even better, a new
plasmid. This ultimately contributes to the game’s commentary on the nature of rhetoric.
Secondly, the developers often use these environmental feature to “nudge” the player in the
right direction, keeping the player engaged in the game.
An initial level in Bioshock is illustrative of how nudges are used to direct
gameplay. Shortly after exiting the bathysphere, I emerged into a
darkened room and immediately heard the oddly disquieting sound of a
child’s voice. Seeing the path before me blocked by a door with a jammed
control, I followed a set of stairs to an atrium area, passing a large
colorful wall mural advertising something called “plasmids.” In a strange
dispensing machine sat a glowing vial of unknown nature. Unthinking, I
grasped the vial, and very suddenly, and disturbingly, was introduced to
the genetic tonics that would reshape my body, and which would become
a key part of my abilities in the game-world. After the fact, reflecting on
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this level—which is a tutorial on the nature and functioning of plasmids—
I was amazed at how unconsciously I performed this sequence of
behaviors; and then even more amazed when I realized that one of the
nudges was an enormous and beautifully designed neon sign of a hand
literally pointing the way forward up the stairs! It is a mark of the
Bioshock’s confidence that it can so consciously forefront its artifice,
knowing that it will be effective. (Tavinor, 101)
This sort of procedural rhetoric uses the virtual environment to communicate to the player his
current objectives, which direction he should be moving, and offer insight into the game’s
narrative as well. These narrative elements range from Ryan’s objectivist propaganda which still
decorate the grand halls and storefronts in Rapture to audio-diaries, personal voice recordings
of various key figures in Rapture’s recent history. Through these elements, the game is able to
communicate the details of what happened to Rapture in a way that is unique to videogames –
or, more generally, unique to digital environments.
The virtual environments players explore in Bioshock are littered with Andrew Ryan’s
objectivist propaganda – banners proclaim “There are no Gods or Kings, only Man” and the
mythical power of the “Great Chain of Industry,” Ryan’s version of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand
of the market.” An ironic touch, considering the gameplay consists of fighting for survival in the
crumbling, decaying dystopia wherein the player bears witness to the death rattle of Ryan’s
idealistic experiment. The developers of Bioshock took great care to design each environment
to influence the player’s gaming experience, and exploring the collapsing ruins of the failed
utopia is a huge part of the gameplay experience.
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To satisfy the desire for freedom on the part of the player, [linear] games
often encourage a kind of pseudo‐freedom: giving the player as much
freedom as possible within the determinate framework of the narrative
and game, and indeed, striving for an illusion of freedom. To encode their
games while providing the illusion that gamers really are choosing their
own actions, games often “nudge” their players down gameplay chutes.
In behavioral economics, nudges are devices that are used to guide but
not strongly coerce decisions so that people can be encouraged to make
decisions that are beneficial for themselves and their societies. In
videogames, nudges play a similar role, by guiding rather than coercing
the player through a game environment, so that their actions in the
environment are given the illusion of being their own. (Tavinor, 101)
Bioshock makes great use of this “haunted house” style of game design. The player moves
through a linear game environment littered with triggered events that activate when the player
crosses a certain threshold or enters the next room. Of course, these triggered events can be
anything from a conversation with another character to a sudden Splicer surprise attack This
allows players control over their character while still ensuring that the narrative plays out
according to the developers’ design. This illusion of player-choice, despite an ultimately linear
path, is another interesting mechanic that the game later uses to muse on the nature of freewill
and the power of rhetoric to influence our choices… even when we do not realize it.
The environments are so important to the Bioshock experience that the game goes out
of its way to make sure the player’s eyes are constantly surveying the immediate environment
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for threats and useful provisions like ammo or food (which grants a small healing bonus to the
player’s health). One clever way the developers accomplish this is by allowing the player’s
abilities to effect certain parts of the environment. For example, the player is granted a
plasmid-powered ability to shoot lightning from his fingertips early in the game. And since
Rapture is a decaying city on the ocean floor, flooding is a common environmental hazard.
However, if the player shoots electricity at a pool of water, every enemy standing in the pool
gets an extra nasty shock, which is usually enough to take out an entire group of splicers with a
single well-placed attack. This kind of interactivity with the environment ensures that a smart
player is always paying attention to his character’s surroundings, and many of the narrative
elements in Bioshock rely on this in-game awareness. The developers want to make sure the
player does not miss Ryan’s objectivist propaganda or the story-revealing audiotapes from
many characters scattered around Rapture.
Perhaps the most prevalent fictive element in the game are the various audiotapes the
player will stumble upon, strewn throughout the undersea metropolis. There are several key
figures in the short history of Rapture, and by hearing their stories, the player is able to piece
together the history of Rapture’s plasmid-powered civil war. Recording these personal audiodiaries must have been all the rage for the denizens of the fashion-conscious city, because
nearly all the character development for these influential figures comes from these recordings.
The game allows the player to listen to these tapes while playing through the game, and
listening to the people of Rapture recount their drama of their struggles against each other and
against themselves while picking your way through the crumbling remains of Rapture provides
the player with a deep narrative contrast, a “before and after” effect.
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After exiting the bathysphere and taking his first steps into Rapture, Jack hears someone
speaking to him through a short-range radio. The man speaking to us is an Irishman named
“Atlas” (a nod to Ayn Rand’s novel, Atlas Shrugged). He explains that he is the leader of a
resistance movement in Rapture that hopes to kill Andrew Ryan and free Rapture from his
grasp. For much of the game, Atlas tells the player where he needs to go next. He will ask the
player to perform the next task to allow Jack to progress through Rapture and the player to
progress through the game’s early levels. Atlas gives us our primary objective: he asks, “Would
you kindly head to Ryan’s office and kill the son of a bitch?”
Atlas directs us through the Medical Pavilion, where Steinmann, Rapture’s leading
plastic surgeon, has gone completely mad, mutilating his “patients” in his quest for a new kind
of beauty. Steinmann’s new motto is scrawled across the walls of the Pavillion: “Aesthetics are
a moral imperative.” It is here that the player is introduced to Bioshock’s poster children – the
Big Daddies and the Little Sisters. Early in the game, the player spots a Little Sister with a large
syringe in hand, crouched over a splicer’s dead body. Atlas warns the player,
ATLAS: You think that’s a child down there? Don’t be fooled. She’s a Little
Sister now. Somebody went and turned a sweet baby girl into a monster.
Whatever you thought about right and wrong on the surface, well that
don’t count for much down in Rapture. Those Little Sisters, they carry
ADAM; the genetic material that keeps the wheels of Rapture turning.
Everybody wants it. Everybody needs it. (Bioshock, 2007)
ADAM is the substance that makes plasmids possible, and the Little Sisters were designed to
“harvest” ADAM from Splicers with their trademark syringes. It is not uncommon for the player
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to stumble across a group of Splicers attacking a Little Sister to get her ADAM. Luckily for the
girls, each Little Sister has a Big Daddy. The Big Daddies are monstrous men in massive, heavily
armored diving suits. Each one has been conditioned by plasmids to protect his Little Sister at
all costs. Big Daddies wield various weapons, from gigantic drills to high-powered rivet guns.
The Little Sisters were created by Dr. Tenenbaum, a genetic scientist living in Rapture who
helped originally develop ADAM. She speaks with a heavy German accent. An audiotape found
early in the game reveals her origins:
TENENBAUM: I was at German prison camp only of sixteen years old
when I realize I have love for science. German doctor, he make
experiment. Sometime, he make scientific error. I tell him of this error,
and this make him angry. But then he asks, 'how can a child know such a
thing?' I tell him, 'Sometimes, I just know.' He screams at me, 'Then why
tell me?' 'Well,' I said, 'if you're going to do such things, at least you
should do them properly.' (Bioshock, 2007)
She now regrets her actions and is attempting to protect the little girls. Indeed, by the time the
player arrives in Rapture, Tenenbaum has become something of a motherly figure for the Little
Sisters, calling them her “little ones.” Over the course of the game, the player is able to win her
allegiance (and help her achieve redemption) by saving the Little Sisters instead of harvesting
them for ADAM (Bioshock Wiki). The Big Daddies do not attack the player (or the Splicers) until
he or his Little Sister are threatened. If the player can defeat a Big Daddy (a challenging goal
similar to a traditional “boss fight”) he will be able to take all the ADAM for himself. Travinor
explains the procedural rhetoric behind the Little Sisters and their Big Daddy guardians,
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Little Sisters comprise an entirely different kind of gameplay obstacle to
the more conventional Big Daddies. When the player first needs to deal
with a Little Sister [after defeating her Big Daddy], the game instructs:
CHOOSE whether to RESCUE the Little Sister or HARVEST her.
If you harvest her, you get MAXIMUM ADAM to spend on
plasmids, but she will NOT SURVIVE the process.
If you rescue her, you get LESS ADAM, but Tenenbaum has
promised to make it worth your while. (Bioshock, 2007)
Technically, it is not difficult at all to deal with this situation—one merely
presses a button and harvests the little girl. And rationally, in terms of
playing the game, harvesting the girls is the obvious thing to do, as it
allows the player access to more of the ADAM they need to enhance their
own fictional abilities and so to make the game easier. Furthermore, Atlas
has assured the player that the Little Sisters are not really human at all,
but “monsters.” (Tavinor, 97)
This is where the game throws an ethical game obstacle at the player: harvesting the Little
Sister grants the player more powerful abilities, but the animation of the player forcing the
ADAM out of a Little Sister’s glowing eyes while she screams horribly… is unsettling, to say the
least. Tavinor describes his experience with this game mechanic,
But when confronted by the choice, I couldn’t bring myself to harvest the
Little Sister; in fact, the prospect of doing so made me feel queasy. And
so, I saved her, an action that was accompanied by a sudden swelling of
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the accompanying music and my own emotions. This response is not
peculiar to me—I’m not an overly sensitive gamer—as almost everyone I
have spoken to about the game has acknowledged a similar emotional
reaction. Hence the nature of the Little Sister as a game-world obstacle
draws on our psychological response to the fiction: when their first line of
defense has been defeated—the Big Daddies—the Little Sisters use our
own emotions to defend themselves. (Tavinor, 98)
This, of course, ties in directly with the game’s other commentary on controlling others by
manipulating their emotions. In this case, the “rhetoric” is brilliantly simple: most people
experience a visceral emotional reaction to seeing little girls harmed… or cared for. In another
of Tenebaum’s audiotapes, she wonders why they had to be little girls. The answer is obvious to
any player paying attention to the various types of rhetoric found in the game – little girls are
extremely effective at manipulating people’s sentimental emotions of sympathy and care, and
it is just like the scientists of Rapture to exploit this response.
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Atlas tries to manipulate us into destroying the Little Sisters, asserting
that they aren’t really human at all, and of course, part of the
multilayered irony in Bioshock derives from the fact that the Little Sisters
are not really human: they are fictions, part of an imaginary game-world
with no real existence. In the fictional world of Rapture, the Little Sisters
have been genetically designed to manipulate our emotions. But in the
real world, they are fictive artifacts—digital representations—designed to
elicit our emotions of sympathy and care to provide a gameplay obstacle.
(Tavinor, 98)
In this way, the Little Sisters transcend the game experience by playing not only with Jack’s
emotions, but the player’s emotions as well. And the player’s response will manifest ingame
when the player directs Jack to either harvest a Little Sister or save her. This ethical decision
packs extra punch because the player experiences the choice and its consequences exactly as
Jack does.
Our responses to Bioshock… show that we can have emotions that
depend on our existing in the same world as a fictional character,
because we do so through a player-character proxy. The Big Daddies
provide a vivid case of how we can become fictionally threatened and
fearful for ourselves, and the Little Sisters illustrate the possibility of our
fictional sympathy and care. (Tavinor, 99)
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In an interview with GameSpot, a videogame news site, Bioshock lead designer and
writer Ken Levine offers an anecdote about the surprising ethical force of the Little Sister game
mechanic.
Levine: My favorite story about people saving and harvesting [the Little
Sisters] is when a journalist told me he started harvesting and his fiancé
saw him do it, and he slept on the couch for two days. She found it awful.
Certainly I think that people who encounter the game think about it not
just as [minimum and maximum benefit]… but they think about it in
terms of what am I as a character or a person, a saver or a harvester. And
I think you see a fair amount of consistency. I heard a lot on threads
[from gamers on the Internet] about this… I think it's something that was
pretty experimental for us in this game, and something we definitely
want to explore further, and take to a deeper level. But my favorite
notion – the thing I'm most happy about – is that people think about it
generally outside of [minimum and maximum benefit], and from the
actual moral choice aspect of it. (GameSpot, 2008)
There is another gameplay mechanic that eventually informs the narrative – “Vita
Chambers” are glass tubes built throughout Rapture. With the advent of ADAM, these
chambers were designed to rebuild a person from disparate particles based on a genetic
recording, allowing the citizens of Rapture to cheat death. However, during Rapture’s civil war
Ryan reprogrammed the chambers to only resurrect him – bringing the insane splicers back
from the dead would only prolong the chaos indefinitely. Atlas explains that the only way to kill
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Ryan for good is to force your way into Ryan Industries Tower and kill Ryan in his office.
Essentially, the Vita Chambers allow the player to jump back into the game in case Jack is killed
by Splicers or a Big Daddy. This is one of the most venerable devices in procedural rhetoric – the
“respawn point.” Players are punished for dying by losing some of the progress they made,
without forcing them to start the game over from the very beginning. That the Vita Chambers
seem to work on Jack is something of a mystery, one that is explained in a crucial cutscene later
in the game.
In the hours of gameplay leading up to a face-to-face confrontation with Ryan, the player learns
more about the man and his city through his audiotapes. At the same time, these tapes offer
the player insight into Ryan’s ideology and his motivation for building Rapture.
RYAN: What is the difference between a man and a parasite? A man
builds. A parasite asks ‘Where is my share?’ A man creates. A parasite
says, ‘What will the neighbors think?’ A man invents. A parasite says,
‘Watch out, or you might tread on the toes of God...’ (Bioshock, 2007)
RYAN: To build a city at the bottom of the sea! Insanity. But where else
could we be free from the clutching hand of the Parasites? Where else
could we build an economy that they would not try to control, a society
that they would not try to destroy? It was not impossible to build Rapture
at the bottom of the sea. It was impossible to build it anywhere else.
(Bioshock, 2007)
Ryan’s plans for his undersea utopia seemed to be going well, until a man named Frank
Fontaine appeared on the scene.
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RYAN: This Fontaine fellow is somebody to watch. Once, he was just a
menace, to be convicted and hung. But he always manages to be where
the evidence isn't. He's the most dangerous type of hoodlum... the kind
with vision. (Bioshock, 2007)
Of course, the irony here is that the same could be said of Ryan. Fontaine was a ruthless
businessman… and a thug. Fontaine’s name is a reference to yet another of Ayn Rand’s books,
The Fountainhead, and he quickly becomes a thorn in Ryan’s side, as his businesses were in
open competition with Ryan’s. The straw that broke the camel’s back was the discovery of a
strange species of sea slug they named ADAM. Scientists, lead by Tenenbaum, quickly
harnessed the seemingly magical powers of ADAM to manufacture plasmids to sell to the
citizens of Rapture.
RYAN: There has been tremendous pressure to regulate this plasmid
business. There have been side effects: blindness, insanity, death. But
what use is our ideology if it is not tested? The market does not respond
like an infant, shrieking at the first sign of displeasure. The market is
patient, and we must be too. (Bioshock, 2007)
Ryan’s patience lasted only long enough for Fontaine to monopolize the plasmid market. With
his newfound wealth, Fontaine began pushing aggressively to buy out Ryan Industries. To make
matters worse, the citizens of Rapture began to show signs of mutation and madness. Ryan
refused to outlaw the plasmids, as the free market was the cornerstone of the ideology upon
which Rapture was founded. When Ryan discovered smugglers bringing in bibles, he felt he had
to criminalize them to avoid Christian (“parasite”) values of charity and kindness from
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contaminating his capitalist experiment. Eventually, fighting broke out in the shopping centers
and theatres of Rapture, and Ryan had to begrudgingly install a degree of martial law.
RYAN: The death penalty in Rapture! Council's in an uproar. Riots in the
streets, they say! But this is the time for leadership. Action must be taken
against the smugglers. Any contact with the surface exposes Rapture to
the very Parasites we fled from. A few stretched necks are a small price
to pay for our ideals. (Bioshock, 2007)
Someone has to clean the toilets in Rapture, and the incredibly unbalanced distribution of
wealth lead to widespread unrest. Atlas appeared seemingly out of nowhere, as the leader of
an organized revolution. When Ryan began hanging criminals, full-scale riots broke out all over
the city. It was at this time that Ryan Industries began experimenting with new ways to
maintain order in Rapture.
RYAN: Doctor Suchong, frankly, I'm shocked by your proposal. If we were
to modify the structure of our commercial plasmid line as you propose, to
have them make the user vulnerable to mental suggestion through
pheromones, would we not be able to effectively control the actions of
the citizens of Rapture?
Free will is the cornerstone of this city. The thought of sacrificing it is
abhorrent. However... we are indeed in a time of war. If Atlas and his
bandits have their way, will they not turn us into slaves? And what will
become of free will then? Desperate times call for desperate measures.
(Bioshock, 2007)
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One of Ryan’s most recent audiotapes, recorded days before Jack’s plane crashes, reveals that
he finally begins to have doubts.
RYAN: Could I have made mistakes? One does not build cities if one is
guided by doubt. But can one govern in absolute certainty? I know that
my beliefs have elevated me, just as I know that the things I have
rejected would have destroyed me. But the city... it is collapsing before
my... have I become so convinced by my own beliefs that I have stopped
seeing the truth? Perhaps. But Atlas is out there, and he aims to destroy
me, and destroy my city. To question is to surrender. I will not question.
(Bioshock, 2007)
Finally, after several hours of tense exploration and survival techniques (buying food from
vending machines to restore lost health, for example) the player leads Jack into Ryan’s Tower.
Ryan speaks to the player through his Tower’s PA system, and he takes a surprisingly tender
tone.
RYAN: So far away from your family, from your friends, from everything
you ever loved. But, for some reason you like it here. You feel something
you can't quite put your finger on. Think about it for a second and maybe
the word will come to you: nostalgia. Even in the book of lies, sometimes
you find truth. There is indeed a season for all things. And now that I see
you flesh-to-flesh and blood-to-blood, I know I cannot raise my hand
against you. But know this: you are my greatest disappointment.
Come now, my child. There is one final thing to discuss. (Bioshock, 2007)
49

The player leads Jack through the Tower until he stumbles upon a strange room. The wall is
covered in photographs… including some pictures of Jack and his parents! The words “Would
you kindly” are scrawled across the wall of photographs. despite the disturbing room, there is
little for Jack to do except continue to Ryan’s office. The confrontation with Andrew Ryan is the
key revelatory scene for the game’s narrative, and it is in this cutscene that Bioshock drives
home its commentary on controlling the acts and thoughts of others through emotionally
stirring rhetoric.
RYAN: The assassin has overcome my final defense, and now he's come
to murder me. In the end what separates a man from a slave? Money?
Power? No, a man chooses, a slave obeys. You think you have memories.
The farm, your family, an airplane, a crash, and then this place. Was there
really a family? Did that plane crash or was it hijacked, forced down,
forced down by something less than a man? Something bred to sleepwalk
through life, until they're activated by a simple phrase spoken by their
kindly master? Was a man sent to kill? Or a slave? A man chooses, a slave
obeys. Come here, stop, would you kindly? ‘Would you kindly…’ a
powerful phrase, a familiar phrase. Sit, would you kindly? Stand, would
you kindly? Run, stop, turn! A man chooses, a slave obeys. Kill! A MAN!
CHOOSES! A slave, obeys. OBEY! (Bioshock, 2007)
Using the conditioning phrase, Ryan chooses to end his life on his own terms, handing Jack a
golf club and speaking the order to kill him.
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Jack, now revealed to be Ryan’s son, cannot resist his genetic conditioning and must
follow all of Ryan’s commands. “…the player is yanked out of control of their character in a selfreferential way: discovering the player-character’s true nature, Ryan is able to take control by
uttering the trigger phrase” (Tavinor, 103). This explains why Fontaine needed Jack to get to
Ryan – Jack’s genetic code matches Ryan’s well enough to allow him to sneak past Ryan’s
defenses and make use of the Vita Chambers, both of which Ryan reprogrammed to respond
only to his genetic pattern. Ryan’s death is shockingly violent, even when compared to the runand-gun gameplay that the player participated in to get here. Again, like the Little Sisters, the
emotional content of the scene hits most players hard, as they, like Jack, no longer have any
control over their actions. Like the opening scene, we are still seeing the game through Jack’s
eyes, but pressing buttons on the controller has no effect.
…a cut-scene in which the player is inert is suddenly reintroduced
because there is a point to be made by the player’s sudden lack of
freedom: they are a pawn in the fictional world of the game. Moreover,
their lack of freedom leads them to kill Ryan at his own orders, and
despite their sudden sympathy. Realizing that he is facing unbeatable
odds, Ryan takes the last piece of free will available to him and ends his
life on his own terms. (Tavinor, 103)
Like Jack, the player must watch helplessly as he kills Ryan, who has turned out to be a
surprisingly sympathetic, tragic sort of character… especially compared to our real foe – Atlas!
Tavinor summarizes this rather complicated plot twist,
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In this key moment of narrative disclosure in Bioshock, the tension
between control and freedom is foregrounded… Bioshock employs an
interactive take on the untrustworthy narrator, in that Atlas—the player’s
principle source of information in the gameworld, and hence the view of
the world that is disclosed to the player— is revealed in the following
scenes to be a distortion. Atlas is not the friendly face he appears to be,
but is Frank Fontaine, the avarice-filled American who is engaged with
Andrew Ryan in a struggle for control of Rapture. The player-character,
furthermore, is a genetically designed monster—much like the Little
Sisters and Big Daddies—programmed by Fontaine for the task of seizing
control of the city. They have been implanted with false memories, and a
trigger phrase “Would you kindly,” and the extraordinarily unlikely plane
crash that led them to Rapture turns out to have been their own doing.
(Tavinor, 102)
Now the tag on Jack’s present back on the airplane makes sense. The tag read, “Would you
kindly not open until: 63’2” N 29’5” W.” The box contained a handgun and another note that
asked “would you kindly” hijack the aircraft and crash it… right next to the lighthouse entrance
of Rapture. As Atlas, Fontaine has been manipulating Jack and the player by working the
seemingly harmless phrase “would you kindly” into his instructions over the radio. Thus Jack’s
experience of the narrative runs parallel to the player’s experience of the narrative – as a player
playing a videogame, most players do not think twice about Atlas’s instructions, since that kind
of handholding is extremely common in videogame rhetoric.
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At the same moment that the character realizes that they are a pawn in a
struggle between Ryan and Fontaine, the player is made to realize that
they are a pawn in the game and narrative of Bioshock. Fontaine, through
his sympathetic shill Atlas, has played us for a fool by the means of
manipulating our motivations and our information about the world. But
at the same time, the game has manipulated us through its use of
environmental nudges, game-world obstacles, and objectives we have
been kindly asked to achieve, so that for the most part, we have
“sleepwalked” through the game, unaware of the artifice, an actor in
someone else’s artwork. (Tavinor, 102)
Like Jack, the player was preconditioned to follow Atlas’s commands, without even realizing he
was being manipulated. Robbing the player of control and forcing us to watch Jack murder Ryan
brings this meta-narrative twist to light in an extremely personal way. Fontaine has not simply
manipulated Jack; he has manipulated us as well! Fontaine mocks the player in Atlas’s Irish
accent, before dropping it in favor of his authentic, New York accent.
FONTAINE: Nice work, boyo. It's time to end this little masquerade. There
ain't no Atlas kid, never was. In my line of work it takes the full variety of
aliases. Hell once I was even a Chinaman for six months. But you been a
sport, so I guess I owe you a little honesty. The name's Frank Fontaine. I
gotta say, I had a lot of business partners in my life, but you? Of course
the fact that you were genetically conditioned to bark like a cocker
spaniel when I said “would you kindly,” might've had something to do
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with it. But still, as soon as that machine finishes processing the genetic
key you just fished off Ryan I'm gonna run Rapture... You’ve been a pal,
but you know what they say, ‘never mix business with friendship.’ Thanks
for everything kid. Don't forget to say hi to Ryan for me. (Bioshock, 2007)
This climax marks the midway point through Bioshock. For the rest of the game, the player’s
goal becomes finding and killing Fontaine, to stop him from invading the surface with an army
of pheromone-controlled Splicers. If the player has rescued the Little Sisters, the now-human
girls will sometimes appear to show the player the way, and Tenenbaum replaces Atlas as Jack’s
guide through Rapture. She uses her scientific knowledge of plasmids to free Jack from the
“would you kindly” conditioning. If the player has harvested the Little Sisters, however, he is on
his own for much of the rest of the game, and while such a player has more ADAM than a
player that elected to rescue the Sisters, the game is noticeably more difficult despite that
advantage. This adds another layer of complexity to what appeared to be a straightforward,
economical decision.
But my [rational] response to the Little Sisters was… overridden by the
feelings of sympathy and care for the little girls. Saving the Little Sisters
does not have the optimal pay-off in the game-world—it is, properly
speaking, an act of altruism. The interactive fiction of Bioshock thus
engages its players’ potential for altruism to explore a philosophical idea.
(Tavinor, 104)
It is unlikely that the player will have seen Atlas/Fontaine’s betrayal coming, and so would have
no reason to suspect that saving the Little Sisters becomes its own reward later in the game. It
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is a subtle touch, but it nicely illustrates the glaring flaw in Ryan’s version of objectivism –
people are finite creatures, and are rarely in a position to completely and accurately judge what
is in their own rational self-interest... especially with ruthless power mongers like Ryan and
Fontaine. In the same way, It was impossible for Ryan to predict the fantastical discovery of
ADAM on the sea floor, which was what ultimately led Rapture to its decline. Replace
“pheromones” and “plasmids” with mass advertising and political rhetoric (as the game
suggests), and Bioshock’s real-world message becomes clear – we are fundamentally emotional
creatures, so treating human beings as dispassionate, calculating rational agents misses what it
means to be human, biologically, psychologically, and socially. Sure, some people try to create a
distance between their reason and emotions, as Plato advocated, with varying degrees of
success, but in the end we cannot escape our emotional nature. Damasio’s somatic marker
theory uses real-world science to arrive at nearly the same conclusion – our reason is, at some
level, inherently tied to our emotional capacity.
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These themes of freedom and control are also explored by way of the
clearly failing politics of Rapture. The objectivist political manifesto that
drove the construction of the city relied for its credibility on a distortion
of human nature: that people act principally on narrowly economic or
rational motivations; or that at least, if they do not, they could be
convinced to do so by the objectivist propaganda seen throughout
Rapture. But, as becomes clear through the player’s own actions, people
also act from sentiment. We are sympathetic beings, and we care for the
less well off, and for the vulnerable, sometimes to the detriment of our
immediate well-being. (Tavinor, 104)
Ryan did not fully understand this facet of human nature until it was too late for him. This
oversight is the main reason Ryan’s idealistic utopia failed so horribly, a fact repeated again and
again in the audio-diaries left behind by the movers and shakers of Rapture. The science fiction
metaphors are often a bit heavy-handed, but Ryan decided the only way to save his objectivist
utopia was controlling the population of Rapture through pheromones. This is a very simple
illustration of how Ryan’s fanatic ideology is ultimately self-defeating, because it lacks
humanity.
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